Thursday, June 30, 2016

What is Conservatism? (Part 2)


This is part two of a two-part series examining what it truly means to be a conservative in the American tradition in the age of Trump. For part one, go here.

The differing national heritages of the United States and many European nations gives rise to another important distinction, apart from the relative importance of land versus ideas dynamic I discussed yesterday: American conservatives worthy of the name actively seek to roll back the federal government and its power, believing that the best and most effective governments are those at the state and local levels, those closest to the people.

Most European conservatives, meanwhile, lie somewhere between cautiously accepting their respective welfare states, and actively embracing them. Their conservatism is fiercely protective of territorial integrity, of controlling immigration and fighting foreign influences, but is largely accepting of the concept of the welfare state, believing only that its growth must be slowed, and its many national programs be better managed. (This comparison can, once again, be better illustrated by the debate over Brexit, in which a key talking point for Vote Leave campaigners was that the United Kingdom, if separated from the E.U., would be able to use money currently being funneled to the E.U. to instead increase funding for the National Health Service.)

This difference between American and European conservatism can again be traced to their respective national histories, as well as their unique systems of government. European nations, evolving naturally over time, either saw the emergence of a strong central government which then created local governments as it saw fit, or (particularly in the case of Germany) saw several states band together for mutual safety and protection, and eventually give up most power to a strong central government.

In America, by contrast, a strong central government of the kind embraced in Europe never emerged, as the Founders by design avoided any governmental system which could potentially lead to a monarchy similar to the one the new nation had just fought a war to escape. In the system of federalism enshrined in the Constitution, the state governments retained much of their power, ceding to the national government only those powers necessary to conduct foreign affairs and keep the internal functions of the Union, and the relationships between the states, running smoothly.

Unlike virtually any other country, America remains the only nation in which the state governments (or the equivalent) are truly coequal, sovereign governments alongside the national government, despite continuing attempts by the latter to increase power at the expense of the states. American conservatives continually fight to preserve this unique balance of power, something absent in European, and all other, models of government.

These, then, are the interrelated features that set American conservatives apart from their counterparts in other countries: that they seek to preserve the ideals and basic mode of limited government set forth in the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, rather than merely preserving the security or territorial integrity of the country. There have been attempts by some to copy these uniquely American aspects in other countries, such as basic models of federalism-style limited government, but they have been considerably less successful than the original experiment, largely because those other nations lack a history and founding documents that easily facilitate the implementation of such ideas.

And the similarities and differences between these models of conservatism and Donald Trump, who frequently invokes national identity and claims to be a better manager, without mentioning America’s founding ideals or unique model of limited government, seems stark indeed.

But in regard to the question “What is American conservatism?”, the answer seems clear. All conservatives seek to conserve some object or idea. What truly constitutes an American conservative is the desire to conserve the American experiment, as embodied by the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and related documents such as the Federalist Papers. If these were suddenly removed tomorrow, and replaced with a model of government exactly the same as France’s, most Americans would say that their country had been destroyed. The United States would still be an independent country, still occupy the same borders, but would be unrecognizable as America.

That is what American conservatives seek to prevent. At its heart, American conservatives seek to conserve the American experiment, an experiment begun as a radical idea by a few revolutionaries two and a half centuries ago. In that sense, conservatives are preserving a radically liberal idea in the history of man.

Wednesday, June 29, 2016

What is Conservatism? (Part 1)


On Monday I wrote that “if Trump wins, the conservative movement is finished.” Others, both during and after the primary season, have made similar points that Donald Trump is not a political conservative, that many of his policies as President would effectively be identical to those of Hillary Clinton, and therefore that a vote for Trump is essentially a vote for Clinton, and vice versa.

This argument, which is countered by many Trump supporters who argue that their candidate is either (a) actually a traditional conservative, or (b) redefining conservatism, highlights a problem which has been steadily gaining importance on the Right for years. With virtually all Republican officials and candidates now claiming the mantle of conservatism, and the word coming to mean an increasing number of things to a variety of individuals and groups, not all of whom necessarily agree, what does political conservatism actually mean today? Over the next couple days I’ll attempt to define my take on what truly constitutes a conservative in modern American politics.

A key distinction first needs to be pointed out between the terms “American conservative” and “European conservative”, a distinction which goes a long way toward formulating an appropriate working definition of the former. It’s a common occurrence, especially for American mainstream media covering international politics, to hear the word “conservative” used in a way that suggests commonality of purpose, or that American conservatives will automatically support every item on the agenda of European conservatives. While it’s true that conservatives internationally may indeed agree on some critical issues (such as whether Britain should remain in the E.U.), there is also an important distinction that colors such issues.

Old World conservatives tend to be much more attached to nationalism and a sense of common national identity than American conservatives. This of course isn’t to suggest that American conservatives don’t care about national identity or their country, but to instead highlight the fact that Americans in general perceive national identity, and patriotism, in a way different from many Europeans.

Whereas European countries evolved over many centuries, are deeply rooted in changing territorial boundaries, and trace their cultural lineage based on migrating tribes, languages, and historical fealty to conquering monarchs, America is founded on a much different heritage. From the beginning, America was based on ideas of liberty, equality, and democracy, ideas deeply radical at the time the Constitution was written.

Rather than sharing a long history with each other and with the land they inhabited, the American colonists at the time of the Founding were immigrants or the sons and daughters of immigrants, mainly from England or other English colonies in the Americas, who shared a desire for freedom and a different government system than the intrusive monarchy they had grown up under. Ideals of freedom and liberty, then, more so than any shared history of blood or land, became what bound the new nation together.

These differing national histories continue to shape the respective politics of Europe and America today. Where the European Right concerns itself with preserving the physicality of nations and institutions which have existed in various forms for hundreds of years, perhaps even a thousand or more, the American Right concerns itself with preserving the ideals that continue to propel the United States. America is the only nation in the history of the world to have been primarily founded on ideas, rather than shared land or languages, and this continues to color the mission of the conservative movement.

Tomorrow I'll conclude with some additional thoughts on the differences between European and American conservatives, and how these distinctions can help us define the latter in the age of Trump.

Tuesday, June 28, 2016

The Genius of Capitalism and a Federal Separation of Powers


Especially since the 2008 financial crisis, capitalism has come under attack, most recently culminating in Bernie Sanders’ attempt to mainstream socialism as an alternative during the Democratic presidential primary—and getting 12.4 million votes in the process. With this in mind, it’s worth remembering just why capitalism is the most successful economic system in history, and why it so effectively complements America’s unique system of a federal separation of powers—another system under attack by both the current President and the two major-party nominees to succeed him.

Unlike economic systems such as socialism and communism, which attempt to redistribute wealth, enforce absolute financial equality on everyone, and are in general overly idealistic to the point of delusion regarding basic economic principles and human nature, capitalism is an essentially realistic model that is clear-eyed about human nature. While socialism attempts to enforce social equality based on what a few people believe human nature should be, capitalism incorporates what human nature actually is. People will generally, for good or ill, act based on what is best for their own interests. Capitalism, unlike socialism, acknowledges this—and then harnesses basic human impulses for good results.

Capitalism rests, essentially, on greed—the idea that people will always want more money, compared to both other people and their own current wealth. What the capitalistic economic model does so effectively, however, is to channel that greed, generally considered a negative impulse, into a force for good. In a free market, capitalist society, greed becomes competition, as rival businesses and corporations attempt to outdo each other with regard to two major factors: the quality of the product or service being offered, and the comparative price of that product or service, relative to a competitor’s price for a similar product. Greed is channeled into a drive to create better-quality, cheaper products, all to the benefit of the consumer and the ordinary citizen.

Aside from the obvious (and related) philosophical arguments regarding freedom of choice, capitalism over the long term raises up the working and middle classes far more effectively than socialism. The latter, using brute force in an attempt to make the population equal, instead traps them in poverty (even in the most well-intentioned socialist nations); while the former, embracing and channeling human vices such as greed, lifts the population to higher standards of living, a fact proven by a simple analysis of standards of living worldwide, compared to national economic systems.

What truly highlights the genius of this basic concept, as well as America’s unique relationship with capitalism, can be highlighted by our Constitution’s basic concept of a federal separation of powers. Where in the capitalist economic model greed was the propelling aspect of human nature, in the government model of separation of powers it is power. The three branches of the federal government—legislative, executive, and judicial—are set against each other, with no branch clearly superior or subservient in terms of delegated power. The legislative branch makes law; the executive branch implements those laws; and the judicial branch applies the law, and enforces the Constitutional restrictions on law. Meanwhile, the federal government as a whole is also set against the various state governments, which have their own distinct spheres of influence.

As with the system of capitalism in economics, the American theory of separation of powers is a realist perspective on human nature, recognizing that people will in general seek to accumulate power for themselves. The Founders, knowing this human propensity would endanger the long-term survival of the experiment of the American republic, decided to instead channel the quest for power as a means for the government to control itself. Well-versed in the work of Adam Smith, a British contemporary who helped establish the economic theory of free market capitalism, the Founders saw that his basic economic philosophy could be applied to government as well.

Something the Founders never expected, of course, was that members of one branch of government would willingly cede power to another branch. This relatively recent phenomenon, in which primarily Democratic members of Congress have increasingly pushed for more legislative power to be taken on by the executive branch, is a result of several factors the Framers of the Constitution could be forgiven for not entirely accounting for—including an increased willingness to defer to the judgments of unelected bureaucrats, and the emergence of a party system that many, such as George Washington, argued against.

Nevertheless, the basic model of American constitutional government remains sound, absent a continued willingness by members of multiple branches to damage it in the future. The basic model, unique in government when the Founders first envisioned it two centuries ago, demonstrates both the genius of the Founders and an inherent compatibility—if not symbiosis—between capitalism and the basic structure of American government that few Sanders voters would likely appreciate.

Monday, June 27, 2016

If Trump Wins, The Conservative Movement is Finished


Win or lose, Donald Trump has already done significant damage to the conservative movement, damage that will take years to fully repair. Though Trump himself is about as conservative as Hillary Clinton, the perception of him as a conservative—stemming from a multitude of factors, including his rough fit as a caricature of what the Left imagines a conservative to be; his soon-to-be-ratified status as the leader of the Republican Party, America’s major conservative party; and an embrace by many erstwhile conservative leaders such as Sean Hannity—will be a perception difficult to erase from the American public consciousness. That factor alone will do harm to conservative causes, making supporters more wary of openly pushing for certain policies for fear of being painted as “another Trump”, and in turn making the public more skeptical of any policies bearing even a whiff of Trumpism, or of the party that nominated him.

But this harm, with a Trump loss, can be overcome in time. Public perceptions will fade, aided by an aggressive outreach campaign orchestrated by Republicans and outside conservative groups. By the time the 2020 presidential campaign begins in earnest, the stage will once again be set for a conservative Republican nominee and eventual president, perhaps Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, or Ben Sasse. A Donald Trump 2020 run in this scenario, when the failed candidate will be 74 and have to answer for a 2016 defeat of epic proportions, is unlikely to say the least.

What will be far more devastating to the conservative movement in the long run is a Trump victory in 2016. As I’ve stated previously, I believe that a Trump presidency will not be substantially different from a second Clinton presidency, particularly with regard to domestic policy objectives. The crucial difference will be that with a Clinton presidency, Republicans will be able to unite almost unanimously with each other and with outside conservative groups to defeat liberal goals, and even in defeat be united in opposition, as we’ve seen over the past eight years, from cap-and-trade and Obamacare on.

With a Trump presidency, meanwhile, the GOP and independent conservative groups and individuals will be badly split between loyalty to party, principle, and self-interest. Every liberal, wrongheaded, and constitutionally suspect proposal to come out of a Trump White House and before Congress, whether it be changes to libel laws, a new assault-weapons ban and restricting gun sales to those on the terror watchlist, or a single-payer healthcare system, will cause deep rifts between members and organizations. Do they support the proposals of a Republican president, or oppose liberal proposals at odds with many of the central tenets of the Republican platform? The Bush years, with their excessive spending and bailouts, led to a soul-searching among conservatives and many in the GOP. That period will be nothing compared to what consequences a Trump presidency could have for the conservative agenda, the Republican Party, and ultimately the country. It could easily take decades for all three to recover.

A Clinton presidency will result in terrible policies, and a unification of the Right against those policies. A Trump presidency will result in terrible policies and further splintering of the Right in response.

Friday, June 24, 2016

A Victory for Liberty in the U.K., That Was Heard Around the World


Yesterday the citizens of the United Kingdom scored a victory for freedom, democracy, and the future of their nation. By voting to leave the European Union, voters stood against the political establishment of both Britain and Europe, as well as many foreign leaders such as President Obama, who sought to interfere with an internal political debate over the future of Britain.

It was shameful for Obama, as the head of state of one of the U.K.’s closest allies, to seek to manipulate the results of the referendum by threatening that future trade deals and other diplomatic arrangements between the two countries would be put in jeopardy if Britain voted to Leave. The truth is that the United States and United Kingdom share a common heritage and a special relationship, one that cannot be erased regardless of whether the latter chooses to stay in the E.U.

But luckily, British voters didn’t allow Obama’s meddling to influence their decision. The truth is that, while we as Americans didn’t have a formal stake in the results of yesterday’s referendum, we are by nature pleased whenever principles of liberty and independence win out over a more collectivist argument. We want what’s best for the U.K., and our special relationship and many shared interests ensures that result will ultimately be best for America, as well.

To be sure, there will be some uncertainty for Britain in the weeks and months to come. The members of the European Union are already bound tightly to one another, and as the first country to leave the U.K. will be in uncharted waters. The leaders of the E.U., no doubt furious at the result of the referendum, will do nothing to make the transition easier, in an attempt to quell further talk by other countries of making their own exits. Already, calls are growing louder for France, Sweden, and the Netherlands to hold votes of their own.

And well they should. A majority of the British people yesterday recognized what many critics of the European Union, both in Europe and internationally, have been saying for years—that the Union is, at its heart, an undemocratic entity that suppresses the will of the people in favor of the will of unelected bureaucrats, who offer only ever-expanding regulations and a gradual stripping away of national sovereignty in return.

Member nations of the E.U. are subject to a loss of control over their own borders, replaced by enforced immigration quotas over which neither ordinary voters nor elected officials have any direct say. While our own country struggles with an ever-intrusive federal government seeking to impose new regulations every day, over nearly every conceivable aspect of daily life, we at least have the advantage that they are imposed by our own bureaucrats and elected officials. Citizens of the U.K., as members of the E.U., are subject to laws and regulations voted on neither by themselves, their own national Parliament, nor even by bureaucrats in their own country, but rather by unaccountable decision-makers in Brussels.

Rulings by national courts and congresses in any of the E.U.’s member nations may be superseded by decisions of the European Commission or European Court of Law. Even in some select cases where provisions of national constitutions conflict with European law, the latter takes precedence. Concepts like these are abhorrent to most Americans, and freedom-loving people around the world, but are accepted as part of life by those living within the 28 member nations of the European Union.

Soon to be twenty-seven. The scale of the victory for the British people, for the ideals of freedom and self-government, can hardly be overstated. The system of government currently in place in Europe is a dangerous one, and it is always good to see such systems contract rather than expand, lest they one day serve as models for a future government of our own.

Over two centuries ago, the American colonists stood against Great Britain, won their independence, and created a new government to stand as a beacon for liberty. Yesterday we saw the United Kingdom shine as a similar beacon for the other nations of Europe. It is not an exaggeration to say that yesterday truly, June 23, truly was—as Vote Leave campaigners promised it would be—the U.K.’s own Independence Day.

Thursday, June 23, 2016

The Alt-Right: The True "Cancer on Conservatism"


A few weeks ago, I wrote a post entitled “Five Reasons Why I’m #NeverTrump”. There wasn’t enough space there to fully do justice to what may well be one of the most important, and overlooked, reasons for opposing Donald Trump—his followers. I’ll try to make up for that deficiency here.

When I refer to his supporters in this context, I’m not talking about the average Republican who doesn’t care for Trump personally but is merely supporting the nominee, something I disagree with but understand. Nor am I even talking about many of his primary voters, ordinary people who didn’t necessarily agree with everything Trump said but appreciated his willingness to say those things, and challenge political correctness and the D.C. establishment of both parties. The supporters that make me unwilling to ever support Donald Trump, even in a general election when the likely alternative is Hillary Clinton, are the racists, anti-Semites, and neo-Nazis who worship the ground Trump walks on based merely on the perception that he is an ally of the white nationalist movement—in other words, those now termed as members of the alt-right.

All of the various types of people that make up the alt-right have, of course, been around for centuries (with the obvious exception of neo-Nazis), but only within the past two decades have they begun attempting to attach themselves to the Republican Party, the party of Lincoln, Martin Luther King, and equal rights since its founding. One of the most notable examples of this shift has perhaps been David Duke’s unsuccessful runs for Louisiana governor and U.S. Senate as a Republican in the early 1990’s, in which many individual Republicans and the state and national parties alike took the nearly unprecedented step of abandoning their own nominee. On the whole, however, incidents of racism among Republican voters seemed to be a combination of isolated incidents and liberal fabrication.

David Duke endorsed Trump during the primaries, saying that white voters who favored any other candidate were “betray[ing]…their heritage”, a comment that by itself is disturbing but hardly disqualifying for the recipient of the endorsement. Most candidates for political office have supporters who are less than savory, and no candidate should be held accountable for every single comment made by those supporters.

What sets Trump apart, however, is a combination of his overtly racist comments, which in turn encourage similar statements of support from racist and white-nationalist leaders; his nonexistent denunciations of even the most hateful individuals and groups (is there any person in America who truly needs to better familiarize themselves with the KKK and what they stand for?)—and the level of fierce devotion and almost fanatical loyalty showered on Trump by many of these same individuals and groups.

The term “alt-right” may be new, but it describes an old movement in America, one which had been dying out before being revitalized by the Trump campaign and his many overt, disgusting statements regarding race. Read only a few statements on blogs and Twitter by self-declared alt-righters to understand how fervent their racism and anti-Semitism is—and how invested they are in a Trump victory. If Trump wins, these people, along with their ideas which lain largely dormant for decades, will be dramatically emboldened.

And the Republican Party and conservatism will pay an additional, immediate cost, along with the rest of the country, for despite the name there is nothing conservative about the alt-right—a collection of disgusting individuals who scorn the U.S. Constitution, any alliance with Israel, and the very ideas of liberty and equality which are at the heart of both conservatism and the American experiment. These “race realists” reject everything conservatism and America stands for, but by their very presence, and revitalization in the age of Trump, infect both.

Wednesday, June 22, 2016

What I Think is Happening with Gender Identity


Would that we could return to just a few years ago, when debate over LBGT issues centered entirely around acceptance of same-sex marriage. The debate was fierce, but easy to understand—should the legal definition of marriage remain as the union of one man and one woman, or be expanded to include two people of the same sex, either two men or two women?

We should have known it wouldn’t remain so simple for long.

The fight over same-sex marriage, which quickly morphed into a still-fierce debate over transgender rights and male/female gender identity, is even now shifting yet again, this time into a series of broader arguments over what truly constitutes gender. People are arguing that they are neither male nor female, but some combination of the two, or neither, and want to be referred to as “it”, “ze”, or “hir”. The movement for equal recognition of same-sex marriage—a movement I personally supported, albeit on a state, rather than federal, basis—has been hijacked into a growing movement calling for the recognition of group marriages, or of marriages between fathers and daughters, or between siblings. Similarly, the support network for those who are attempting to transition from male to female has been hijacked by radicals who believe they are dragons or other animals, fictional or otherwise. (I’m purposely not linking to any articles because many are so disturbing, but there are many easily accessible on Google for anyone curious enough to search for them.)

There’s an old experiment many people try growing up, where they purposely start thinking about an involuntary reflex like breathing, or walking. Most of us don’t think about having to breathe a certain number of times per minute, but the moment you begin thinking about it, you have to remind yourself to continue, and it becomes a conscious action. What was an unconscious reflex, taken for granted, rises to the realm of conscious thought.

The metaphor is strained, sure, but I think something similar is going on in society today with regard to gender identity. The concepts of male and female, something rooted in biology and largely unquestioned throughout history, is now being challenged. We as a society are thinking about things that until now have been relegated to the unconscious ticking of human social construct, but is now being challenged as never before. The ease of modern life, enabled by a standard of living that historically would have qualified some of the poorest among us as kings in the Middle Ages, coupled with a dominant liberal culture that still regards itself as a rebel counterculture, has given rise to a willingness to challenge ever more fundamental aspects of human existence.

And where will all this end up? It’s anyone’s guess, but it would be a mistake to think we’ve by any means reached the final end point, and there are only so many aspects of existence previously thought to be fundamental that can be challenged before society as a whole will itself begin to rebel. Until then, and for good or ill, group marriages and interspecies transitions may become as normalized in the public consciousness as same-sex marriage has been, compared to just a few years ago.

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

Trump: The Will of the People? (Part 2)


This is the second of a two-part series examining the overall primary results of the 2016 Republican contest, in an attempt to determine whether Donald Trump is truly "the will of the people", as he and his supporters frequently claim. For part one, go here.

The nationwide number of votes for and against a nominee, though a useful overall metric, doesn’t tell the whole story, or accurately answer the question of whether Donald Trump’s nomination is truly “the will of the people”. The final variable to look at, which will offer a much more specific view of the entire primary season, is a breakdown of the statewide results of each individual primary and caucus, from the Iowa caucuses on February 1 through the final batch of primary states on June 7. Seeing how the numbers for both Trump and his opponents varies between states, and over time, offers a much more useful snapshot of the race as a whole.

Date:
State:
Type:
Trump
Cruz
Rubio
Kasich
2/1
Iowa
Caucus
24.3%
27.6%
23.1%
1.9%
2/9
New Hampshire
Open
35.3%
11.7%
10.6%
15.8%
2/20
South Carolina
Open
32.5%
22.3%
22.5%
7.6%
2/23
Nevada
Caucus
45.9%
21.4%
23.9%
3.6%
3/1
Alabama
Closed
43.4%
21.1%
18.7%
4.4%
3/1
Alaska
Caucus
33.5%
36.4%
15.1%
4.1%
3/1
Arkansas
Open
32.8%
30.5%
24.9%
3.7%
3/1
Georgia
Open
38.8%
23.6%
24.4%
5.6%
3/1
Massachusetts
Open
49.3%
9.6%
17.9%
18.0%
3/1
Minnesota
Caucus
21.3%
29.0%
36.5%
5.8%
3/1
Oklahoma
Closed
28.3%
34.4%
26.0%
3.6%
3/1
Tennessee
Open
38.9%
24.7%
21.2%
5.3%
3/1
Texas
Open
26.7%
43.8%
17.7%
4.2%
3/1
Vermont
Open
32.7%
9.7%
19.3%
30.4%
3/1
Virginia
Open
34.7%
16.9%
31.9%
9.4%
3/5
Kansas
Caucus
23.3%
48.2%
16.7%
10.7%
3/5
Kentucky
Closed
35.9%
31.6%
16.4%
14.4%
3/5
Louisiana
Closed
41.4%
37.8%
11.2%
6.4%
3/5
Maine
Caucus
32.6%
45.9%
8.0%
12.2%
3/6
Puerto Rico
Open
13.6%
9.0%
73.8%
1.4%
3/8
Hawaii
Caucus
42.4%
32.7%
13.1%
10.6%
3/8
Idaho
Caucus
28.1%
45.4%
15.9%
7.4%
3/8
Michigan
Open
36.5%
24.9%
9.3%
24.3%
3/8
Mississippi
Open
47.3%
36.3%
5.1%
8.8%
3/12
Washington, D.C.
Caucus
13.8%
12.4%
37.3%
35.5%
3/15
Florida
Closed
45.7%
17.1%
27.0%
6.8%
3/15
Illinois
Open
38.8%
30.3%
8.7%
19.7%
3/15
Missouri
Open
40.9%
40.7%
6.1%
9.9%
3/15
North Carolina
Open
40.2%
36.8%
7.7%
12.7%
3/15
Ohio
Open
35.6%
13.1%
2.9%
46.8%
3/15
Northern Mariana Islands
Caucus
54.0%
34.4%
1.1%
2.1%
3/22
Arizona
Closed
47.1%
24.9%
13.3%
10.0%
3/22
Utah
Caucus
14.0%
69.2%
---
16.8%
4/5
Wisconsin
Open
35.1%
48.2%
1.0%
14.1%
4/19
New York
Closed
60.4%
14.5%
---
25.1%
4/26
Connecticut
Closed
57.9%
11.7%
---
28.4%
4/26
Delaware
Closed
60.8%
15.9%
0.9%
20.4%
4/26
Maryland
Closed
54.4%
18.9%
0.7%
23.0%
4/26
Pennsylvania
Closed
56.7%
21.6%
0.7%
19.4%
4/26
Rhode Island
Closed
63.8%
10.4%
0.6%
24.4%
5/3
Indiana
Open
53.3%
36.6%
0.5%
7.6%
5/10
Nebraska
Caucus
61.4%
18.4%
3.6%
11.4%
5/10
West Virginia
Open
77.0%
9.0%
1.4%
6.7%
5/17
Oregon
Closed
66.6%
17.0%
---
16.3%
5/24
Washington
Caucus
75.8%
10.5%
---
9.8%
6/7
California
Closed
75.3%
9.2%
---
11.3%
6/7
Montana
Open
73.7%
9.4%
3.3%
6.9%
6/7
New Jersey
Closed
80.4%
6.2%
---
13.4%
6/7
New Mexico
Closed
70.7%
13.3%
---
7.6%
6/7
South Dakota
Closed
67.1%
17.0%
---
15.9%


(As an aside, I also noted whether each state held a caucus, closed primary, or open primary. It has been well analyzed many times by several different people how Trump does far better in the latter type of contest, which allows independents and, in some cases, Democrats to vote in Republican primaries, than in those elections which only allow dedicated Republican voters to participate. That particular angle is one for another discussion, but it is to some degree borne out in the data and leaves open the question of how many of Trump’s plurality of primary voters are even Republicans.)

This chart clearly shows that Trump was struggling to unite the primary electorate behind him as late as May, when he won a bare majority in the Indiana primary which nonetheless effectively ended the GOP primary season. Even later than that, however, and without a major opponent in the race, Trump endured a few embarrassingly small victories, winning just 61% of the vote in the Nebraska caucuses on May 10, and 67% of the vote in the South Dakota primary on June 7, the last night of Republican primary voting. Considering the fact that, as of the South Dakota results, Trump had been effectively unopposed for the nomination for over a month, his vote tally in this contest—in which Ted Cruz and John Kasich received just over 10,000 votes apiece—points to a continuing struggle to win over large segments of the party electorate.

For comparison’s sake, let’s look at a couple vote percentages from late in the 2008 and 2012 primary seasons, when John McCain and Mitt Romney were also running effectively unopposed. In 2008, the Nebraska primary was held on May 13, and the South Dakota and New Mexico primaries were on June 3. John McCain received 87% of the vote in Nebraska; 70% in South Dakota; and 86% in New Mexico. While it is understandable that not every voter would be willing to line up behind any one candidate, particularly after a divisive primary process which lasted for months, McCain was also able to unify a much wider swath of the party behind him, and by the end of the 2008 primary calendar saw none of his statewide vote totals drop anywhere near the percentages Trump has continued to receive.

In 2012, both New Mexico and South Dakota again held their primaries at the beginning of June, this time on June 5. Mitt Romney, by then the presumptive nominee, received 73% of the vote in New Mexico and 66% in South Dakota, figures much closer to those received by Trump at the same point in this election season (in the interest of fairness, Trump did about one percent better in South Dakota than Romney in 2012). However, this point comes with two caveats: first, Romney had effectively secured the nomination by mid-April, with Rick Santorum formally dropping out and Newt Gingrich scaling back operations after losing a string of primaries. By comparison, Donald Trump was still losing primaries, and trailing in state polls of upcoming primary contests, well into April, and his campaign did not begin looking like it would wrap up the nomination before the convention until the “Acela primary” on April 26. This extended intraparty tensions through May and into June, motivating both pro- and anti-Trump voters to show up to the polls through the last day of voting, whereas in 2012 motivation was likely highest for those voters steadfastly opposed to Romney.

And second, this data must be taken alongside all the rest: Trump’s low vote totals in states where he was running unopposed, combined with his struggle to put away the nomination until May, combined with his historically low percentage of votes in the primary nationally, combined with the historically high number of votes cast against him, all point to the conclusion that, far from being “the choice of the people”, Donald Trump is in fact the choice of only a plurality of Republican primary voters, and not an especially strong plurality at that. The numbers do bear out the argument that Romney had certain weaknesses with segments of the party, and the conventional wisdom is indeed that Romney was a comparatively weak nominee. But he at least received an absolute majority of primary votes nationally.
What the numbers do show, beyond a shadow of a doubt, is that the majority of Republican voters wanted nothing to do with Donald Trump from the beginning.